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[L. A. No. 25689. In Bank. Apr. 13, 1961.]

LOUIS BERNKRANT et aI., Appellants, v. DOROTHY
BLACK FOWLER, as Executrix, etc., Respondent.
[1] Decedents' Estates--ActioDS Against Representatives-Actions
Founded on Contracts-Parties.-An action against an executrix to have a promissory note secured by a trust deed cancelled and the property reconveYI'd to plaintiffs and to recover
amounts paid under protest to the executrix after decedent's
death, based on decedent's oral promise to provide by will for
forgiveness of any unpaid balance of the note at the time of
his death in return for plaintiffs' refinancing their obligations
so as to pay a substantial part of their indebtedness to him,
and involving an adverse claim to an interest in real property,
was properly brought against the executrix pursuant to Prob.
Code, § 573, and, since plaintiffs did not seek to enforce a
trnst against any of the beneficiaries of the estate, none of the
beneficiaries was an indispensable party. In view of the fact
that plaintiffs, apart from seeking recovery of sums paid directly to the executrix to protect their interests pending the
action, sought only a determination that pursuant to their
contract With decedent their liability on the note had been
discharged, the executrix represented all those interested in
the estate just as she would have had she brought an action
to enforce the note and been met with the defense that it had
been discharged.
[2] Id.-Claims-Presentation: Actions-Testimony of PartiesTestimony Inhibited.-Whereplaintjffs suing an executrix did
not seek a money judgment payable out of assets of decedent's
estate but only a determination that their obligations had been
discharged, they were not required to file a claim Ilgllinst the
estate (Prob. Code, § 707) and were not precluded by Code

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Executol's Ilnd Administrators, § 1061.
McR:. Dig. Refel'ences: [lJ Dccctll'nt:;' Estates, § 811; (2] Decedents' Estates, §§ 459, 573; l3, 4, 6] WiIIR, § 157; {5] Contlict of
Laws, §23.
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Civ. Proc., § 1880, sllhd. ::I, from testifying to events occurring
before decedent's denth. (Disnpproving Norgard v. E8tate of
Norgard, 54 CaJ.App.2d 82, ]28 P.2d 566, to extent it indicates
that ('oue Civ. Pro!' .. ISSO, ~uhd. 3. is nppli!':lhle in adion
such as this.)
Wills-Agreements as to Wills-Oral Agreements-Statute of
Frauds.-California's intel'c,;t in protecting estntes being probated here from false claillls based on alleged oral contracts
to make wills would be constitutionally suffieient to justify the
Legislature's making our stntute of frauds applicable to all
such contracts sought to be enforced against such estates.
Id.-Agreements as to Wills-Oral Agreements-Statute of
Frauds.-In an action against an executrix to have a promissory note ;<ecured by a tru;.:t deed cancclled und the property
reconveyed to plaintiffs and to recover amounts puid under
protest to the executrix after decedent's death, based on
decedent's oral promise to provide by will for forgiveness of
any unpaid balance at the time of his death in return for
plaintiffs' refinancing their obligations so as to pay a substantial part of their indebtedness to him, where plaintiffs were
residents of Nevada, the contract was made in that state and
plaintiffs performed it there, the California statute of frnuds,
in the absence of plain legislative direction to the contrary,
could not reasonably be interpreted as applying to the contract
though decedent subsequently moved to California and died
here. The basic policy of upholding the expectations of the
parties by enforcing contracts valid under the only law apparently applicable would preclude an interpretation of the California statute of frauds that would make it apply to and thus
invalidate the contract because decedent moved to this state
and died here.
Conllict of Laws-Procedure-Statute of Frauds.-Just as parties to local transactions cannot be expected to take cognizance
of the law of other jurisdictions, they cannot be expected to
anticipate a change in the local statute of frauds. Protection
of rights growing out of valid contracts precludes interpreting
the general language of the statute of frauds to destroy such
rights whether the possible applicability of the statute arises
from the movement of one or more parties across state lines
or subsequent enactment of the statute.
Wills---Agreements as to Wills---Oral Agreements---Statute of
Frauds.-In an action against an executrix to have a promissory note secured by a trust deed cancelled and the property

*

[3]

[4]

)

[6]

[6]

[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Wills, § 513 et seq.; Am.Jur., Statute of
Frauds, § 561, Wills, § 167.
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Conflict of Laws, § 95; Am.Jur., Conflict of
Laws, § 198 et seq.
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reconveyed to plaintiffs and to recover amounts paid under
protest to the executrix after decedent's death,based on
decedent's oral, promise to provide by will for fOl'gin:oness of
any unpaid balance At the time of his death in return for
plaintiffs' refin:lllcing their obligations so as to pay a substantial part of their indebtedness to him, in which there was no
finding as to where decedent was domiciled at the time the
contract was ma(h-, e\'en if he was dOl!lifi\£'tl in California at
the time the contrnct was lIu1I1!' the result should be the same
as if he were domiciled in Nevn<la, where the contract was
made there and performed by plaintiffs'ther£', and it involved
the refinancing of obligations arising from the sale of Nevada
land and secured by interests therein. Nevada had a substantial interest in the contract and in protecting the rights
of its residents who wcre parties thereto, and it!! policy was
that the contract was valid and enforccable.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. James G. Whyte, Judge. Reversed.
Action against an executrix to have an installment note
secured by a trust deed cancelled and the property reconveyed
to plaintiffs, aud to recover amounts paid under ·protest to the
executrix after decedent's death. Judgment for defendant
reversed.
Betty Aronow and George Rudiak for Appellants.
Egley & Wiener and Paul Egley for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiffs appeal on the clerk's transcript
from a judgment for defendant as executrix of the estate of
John Granrud. They contend that the findings of fact do
not support the jUdgment.
Some time before 1954 plaintiffs purchased the Granrud
Garden Apartments in Las Vegas, Nevada. In 1954 the
property was encumbered by a first deed of trust given to
secure an installment note payable to third parties and a
second deed of trust given to secure an installment note payable to Granrud at $200 per mouth plus interest. Granrnd's
note and deed of trust provided for subordination to a deed
of trust plaintiffs might execute to secure a construction loan.
In July 1954, there remained unpaid approximately $11,000
on the note secured by the first deed of trust and approximately $24,000 on the note payable to Granrud. At that time
Granrud wished to buy a trailer park and asked plaintiffs
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to refinance their obligations and pay a l'ubstantial part of
their indebtedness to him. At a meeting in Las Vegas he
stated that if plaintiffs would do so, he would provide by will
that any debt that remained on the purcha~e price at the time
of his death would be cancelled and forgiYcn. Plaintiff's then
arranged for a new loan of $25,000, the most they could
obtain 011 the property, secured by a llew first Med of trust.
They used the proceeds to pay the balance of the loan ~ecured
by the existing first deed of trust and $13,114.20 of their
indebtedness to Granrud.They executed a new note for the
balance of $9,227 owing Granrud, payable in installments of
$175 per month secured by a new second deed of trust. Thi~
deed of trust contained no subordination provision. The
$13,114.20 was deposited in Granrud's bank account in Covina, California and subsequently used by him to buy a trailer
park. Plaintiffs incurred expenses of $800.90 in refinancing
their obligations.
Granrud died testate on March 4, 1956, a resident of Los
Angeles County. His will, dated January 23, 1956, was admitted to probate, and defendant was appointed executrix of
his estate. His will made no provision for cancelling the balance of $6,425 due on the note. at the time of his death. Plaintiffs have continued to make regular payments of principal
and interest to defendant under protest.
Plaintiffs brought this action to have the note cancelled
and discharged and the property reconveyed to them and to
recover the amounts paid defendant after Granrud's death.
The trial court concluded that the action was barred by both
the Nevada and the California statute of frauds; that to remove the bar of the statutes, the action must be one for
quasi-specific performance in which an heir or beneficiary
under the will would be an indispensable party; and that defendant was not estopped to rely on the statutes of frauds.
[1] Probate Code, section 573, provides that "Actions
for the recovery of any property, real or personal, or for the
possession thereof, or to quiet title thereto, or to enforce a
lien thereon, or to determine any adverse claim thereon, and
all actions founded upon contracts . . . may be maintained
by and against executors and administrators in all cases in
which the cause of action whether arising" before or after
death is one \vhich would not abate upon the death of their respective testators or intestates. . . . " Since the present action
is founded on contract and involves an adverse claim to an
interest in real property, it was properly brought against

592

BER:-IKRAST ". FOWLER

[55 C.2n

---------------------------- --the executrix pursuant to this section. Moreov('r, ;;ill('(> plaill'
tiffs do not scek to enforcc a trnst against any of thc hell('ficiarics of thc estate, 11011(' of the beneficiaries is all indis·
pensable party. (Cf. Balik of Ca7ilornia v. Superior Court,
16 Ca1.2d 516, 524 [106 P.2d 879].) Apart from seeking the
recovery of snms paid tlirectl~' to deff>udant to protcei thcir
interests pending the action, plaintiffs seek only a detl!rmination that pursuant to their contract with Granrml their
liability on the note has been discharged ann the s('curity
interest in the property thereby r(,'leased, Under these circumstances defendant represents all those interested in the
estate just as she would had she brought an action to enforC'e
the note and been met with the defens(' that it had been discharged. (McCaugh(!f Y. LYf!ll, 152 Cal. 615, 616-618 f!)3
P. 681] ; Patchett v, Webber, 198 Cal. 440, 448 [24[) P. 422] ;
Estate of Kessler, 32 Cal.2d 367, 369 [196 P.2d 5;')9] ; Schroeder
v. Wilson, 89 Cal.App.2d 6:3. 68-69 [200 P.2d In]; Bank
of America v. O'Shields, 128 Cal.App.2d 212, 217 [275 P.2d
153] ; Ca.digan v. American Trust Co., 131 Cal.App.2d 780,
781 [281 P.2d 332] ; Beyl Y. Robinson, 179 Cal.App.2d 444,
456 [4 Ca1.Rptr. 18].)
[2] Moreover, sinee plaintiffs do not seek a money judgment payable out of the assets of the estate but only a determination that their obligations have been discharged, they
were not required to file a claim against the estate (see Prob.
Code, § 707) and were not precluded by suhdivision 3 of
section 1880 of the Code of Civil Proredure 1 from testifying
to events occurring before Granrud's {leath. (Porter v. Van
Denbu.rah, 15 Cal.2d 173, 176-177 [99 P.2d 265]; Sal'i'nrl'~
Union Bank etc. Co. v. CI'Oldcy, 176 Cal. 543, 547 [169 P.
67]; Calmon v. Sarraille. 142 Cal. 638, 642 [76 P. 486J;
Alvarez Y. Rt:tter, 67 Cal.App.2d 574, 579-580 r155 P.2d 831 ;
Streeter v. Martinelli, 65 Cal.App.2d 65, 71-73 [149 P.2d
725] ; Beyl v. Robin.son, 179 Cal.App.2d 444, 455-456 [4 Cal.
Rptr. 18] ; Sperry v. Tammany, 106 Cal.App.2d 694, 698 [23;')
P.2d 8471 ; Jliller &- Lux, Inc. v. Katz, 10 Cal.App. 576, 578
[102 P. 946] ; see People v. Olvera, 43 Cal. 492, 494.) To
the extent that it indicates that suhdivision 3 of section 18Bn
'Section 1880 provides: "The following per80ns cannot be witnesses:
"3. Parties or assignors of parties to an artion or proceeding, or
persons in whose behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted, against
an executor or administrator upon a claim, or (kmand against the estate
of a dec~ased person, as to any matter or fact occurring before the death
ot such tleeeased person. "

)

)
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is applicable in an action sllch as this OI1t', Norgard v. Estate
of Norgard, 54 Cal.App.2d 82 [128 P.2d 566], is inconsistent
with the fort'going authoritit's and is disapproved.
Subdivision 6 of section 1624 of the Civil Code provides
that" An agre<.>ment which by its terms is not to be performed
during the lifetime of the promisor, or an agreemcnt to devise
or bt'queath any property, or to make any provision for any
person by will" is "invalid, unless the samt', or some note
or memorandum thereof, is in writing and subs('ribt'd by the
party to be ('harged or by his agcnt." (See also Code Civ.
Proc., § 1973, subd. 6.) Plaintiffs concede that in th.e absence
of an estoppel, the contract in this case would be invalid
under this provillion if it is subject thercto. They contend,
llowever, that only the Nevada statute of frauds is applicablc
and point out that the Nevada statute has 110 counterpart
to subdivision 6. Defendant contends that the California
statute of frauds is applicablt', and that if it is not, the Neyada
statute of frauds covering real property transactions invalidates the cOlltract.2
We have found no Nevada case in point. We believe, how('vel', that Nevada would follow the general rule in other jurisdictions, that an oral agreement providing for the discharge
of an obligation to pay money secured by an interest in rt'al
property is not within the real property provision of the
statute of frauds, on tile ground that the termination of the
sceurity interest is merely incidental to and follows by operation of law from the discharge of the principal obligation.
(Sell weider v. Lang, 29 Minn. 254 [13 N.W. 33, 34, 43 Am.
Rep. 202] ; Givens v. Featherstone, (Tex.Ciy~App.) 12 S.W.2<l
613. 614]; Riley y. A.tllrTfon. 185 Ark. 425 [47 S.W.2d
568]; Brown v. Ruffin, 189 N.C. 262 [126 S.E. 613, 616];
P'irst Nat. Balik v. Gallo(lhrr. 119 Millll. 46:3 [138 N.W. 681,
682, Ann.Cas. 1914B 120] ; Runyan v. IIfrr.~e,.call, 11 Johns.
"Nevada Revised Statutes, section 111.!!0.', suh<1h'j"ion 1, Pl'o\'i<1cs:
"No estate or interest in lands, other than for lI~asP9 for n term not
.~xeeelling one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning lands, or
in any m:\llI1er relating thereto, shall bc ('reated, grantell, a~~igned,
~urren<1ered or declared after December 2, lS61, unless by act or opera·
tion of law, or by deed or conveyun"e, in writing, subscribed by the party
('reating, granting, assigning, surr('ndering, or cle..J:lI'illg the sallie, or by
his lawful ngent th('1'('unto allthorize.t in writinJr."
Seetion 111.210, 9uhdh'i8ion I, provides: "Evt'ry contract for the
leasing for n longer period than one yenr, or for the snle of nny lands,
or IIny interest 11\ lanc1s, shall he void unless the ('ontract, or some note
or memorlllulllm tlw1'l'of, exprl.'s~illg the (',,"sidt'rntioll. )... in wl'iting. and
be subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to be made."
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(N.Y.) 534, 538; Aclola ". Ackla, 6 Pa. 228, 230; McKenzie
". Stewart, 196 Ala. 241 [72 So. 109, 110] ; Mutual Mill Ins.
Co. v. Gordo~, 12 Ill. 366 (12 N.R 747, 750]; Benavides
v. White, 94 CaLApp.2(1 849, 850 [211 P.2d 597]; see also
Wright v. Donaubauer, 137 Tex. 473 [154 S.W.2<l 637, 639] ;
Rigney v. Lovejoy, 13 N.H. ~-17, 253; D01lgherty v. Randan,
3 Mich. 581. 58G; Ply!'/' Y. Sulliran. 284 App.Div. 697 [134
N.Y.S.2d 521, 523J; 2 Corhin 011 Contracts, pp. 394-397;
contra, Parker v. Barker, 43 Mass. (2 Mete.) 423, 431-432;
Duff v. United Statcs Tnlsf Co., 327 Mass. 17 [97 N.E.2d 189,
191] ; Brooks v. Benham, 70 Conn. 92 [38 A. 908, 910, 39 A.
1112, 66 Am.St.Rep. 87] j Phillips v. Leavitt, 54 Me. 405, 407.)
We are therefore confronted with a contract that is valid
under the law of Nevada but invalid under the California
statute of frauds if that statute is applicable. [3] We have
no doubt that California's interest in protecting estates being
probated here from false claims based on alleged oral contracts to make wills is <'>ollstitutionally sufficient to justify
the Legislature's making our statute of frauds applicable to
all such contracts sought to be enforced against such estates.
(See Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 298 [113
N.E.2d 424] j Emery v. Burballk, 163 Mass. 326-329 [39 N.E.
1026, 47 Am.St.R<.>p. 456, 28 L.R.A. 57J.) The Legislature,
however, is ordinarily concerned with enacting laws to govern
purely local transactions, and it has not spelled out the extent to which the statute of frauds is to apply to a contract
having substantial contacts with another state. Accordingly,
we must determine its scope in the light of applicable prineiples of the law of conflict of laws. (See People v. One 1953
Ford Victoria, 48 Ca1.2d 595, 598-599 [311 P.2d 480J j 2
Corbin on Contracts, p. 67; Currie, Married Women's Contracts, 25 U. Chi. h Rev. 227, 230-231; Cheatham and Reese,
Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 Columbo L. Rev. 959, 961.)
[4] In the present case plaintiffs were residents of Nevada, the contract was made in Nevada, and plaintiffs performed it there. If Granrud was a resident of Nevada at the
time the contract was made, the California statute of frauds,
in the absence of a plain legislative direction to the contrary,
('ould not reasonably be interprct<.>d as applying to the contract even though Gt'anrud subsequently moved to California
and died here. (See MeCn7,(' \'. Baqby, 186 F.2d 546, 550.)
The basic policy of uphold illl-r thp expectations of the parties
by enforcing contracts valid U1Hler the only law apparently
applicable would preclude an interpretation of our statute

-)
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of fl'lntds that would make it apply to and thus invalidate
the contra(~t bccllul';e GI'anrnc1 movl'd to California and died
here. Sueh a cal'le would he analogous to People v. One 1953
Ford Victoria, 48 CIl1.2d 595 [311 P.2d 480], where we held
that a T('xas lllol·tgngee of all automobile mortgaged in Texas
did not forfl'it his interest when the automobile was subsequently used to tl'ansport narcotics in California although
he had failed to make the character investigation of the
mortgagor required by California law. A mortgagee entering
into a purely local transaction in another state could not
reasonably be expected to take eognizance of the law of all
other jurisdictions where the property might possibly be
taken,and accordingly, the California statute requiring an
investigation to protect his interest could not reasonably be
interpreted to apply to such out.of-state mortgagc('s. Another
analogy is found ill the holding that the statute of frauds
did not apply to contl'actl'! to make wills entered into before
the statute was enacted (Rogcrs v. Schlotterback, 167 Cal.
35, 45 [138 P. 728 J). [ 5 ] Just as parties to local transactions cannot be expected to take cognizance of the law of
other jurisdictions, they canllot be expected to anticipate a
change in the local statute of frauds. Protection. of rights
growing out of valid contracts precludes interpreting the
general language of the statute of frauds to destroy such
rights whether the possible applicability of the statute arises
from the movement of one or more of the parties across state
lines or subsequent enactment of the statute. (See Currie and
Schreter, UncO'1l.ditutional Discrimination in tke Oonflict of
Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69 Yale L.J. 1323, 1334.)
[ 6 ] In the present case, however, there is no finding as
to where Granrud was domiciled at the time the contract was
made. Since he had a bank account in California at that time
and died a resident here less than two years later it may be
that he was domiciled here when the l'ontract was made.
Even if he was, the result should be the same. The contract
wa'> made in Nevada and performed by plaintiffs there, and
it involved the refinancing of obligations arising from the
sale of Nevada land and secured by iuterests therein. Nevada
has a substantial interest in the contract and in protecting
the rights of its residents who are parties thereto, and its
policy is that the contract is valid and enforcible. California's
policy is also to enforce lawful contracts. That policY,however, must be subordinated in the case of any contract that
does not meet the requirements of an applicable statute of

)
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frauds. III determillill~ whether the contract herein is subjeet
to the California statute of frauds, we must consider both the
policy. to protect the reasonable expectations of the parties
and the policy of the statute of frauds. (See Cheatham and
Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 Columbo L. Rev. 959,
978-980.) It is true that if Granrud was domiciled here at
the time the contract was made, plaintiffs may have been
alerted to the possibility that the California statute of frauds
might apply. Since California, however, would have no interest in applying its own statute of frauds unless Granrud
remained here until his death, plaintiffs were not bound to
know that California's statute might ultimately be invoked
against them. Unless they could rely on their own law, they
would have to look to the laws of all of the jurisdictions to
which Granrud might move regardless of where he was domiciled when the contract was made. We conclude, therefore,
that the contract herein does not fall within our statute of
frauds. (See 2 Corbin on Contracts, p. 76; Lorenzen, The
Statute of Fmuds and tile Conflict of Laws, 32 Yale hJ. 311,
338; EhrcJ1zwei~, The Statute of Frauds in the Conflict of
Laws, 59 Columbo L. Rev. 874; Currie and Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict o.f Laws: Equal Protection, 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 51.) Since there is thus no conflict
between the law of Californiaalld the law of Nevada, we
can give effect to the common policy of both states to enforce
lawful contracts and sustain Nevada's interest in protecting
its residents and their reasonable expectations growing out
of a transaction substantially relatpd to that state without
subordinating any legitimate interest of this state .
. The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J.,
and Dooling, J., coneurred.

